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Abstract. Microaggregation is one of the most commonly employed
microdata protection methods. This method builds clusters of at least k
original records and replaces the records in each cluster with the centroid
of the cluster. Usually, when records are complex, i.e., the number of
attributes of the data set is large, this data set is split into smaller blocks
of attributes and microaggregation is applied to each block, successively
and independently. In this way, the information loss when collapsing
several values to the centroid of their group is reduced, at the cost of
losing the k-anonymity property when at least two attributes of diﬀerent
blocks are known by the intruder.
In this work, we present a new microaggregation method called One
dimension microaggregation (Mic1D − κ). This method gathers all the
values of the data set into a single sorted vector, independently of the
attribute they belong to. Then, it microaggregates all the mixed val-
ues together. Our experiments show that, using real data, our proposal
obtains lower disclosure risk than previous approaches whereas the in-
formation loss is preserved.
Keywords: Microaggregation, k-anonymity, Privacy in Statistical
Databases.
1 Introduction
Conﬁdential data is usually released to third parties (e.g., politicians and re-
searchers) for data analysis. This dissemination has to be in accordance with
laws and regulations to avoid the publication of critical private information. In
this situation, it is necessary to release data preserving the statistics without
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revealing conﬁdential information. This is a typical problem, for instance, in
oﬃcial statistics institutes.
Special eﬀorts have been made to develop a wide range of protection methods.
These methods aim at guaranteeing an acceptable level of protection of the
conﬁdential data. Speciﬁc areas such as Privacy in Statistical Databases (PSD)
tackle the problem of protecting conﬁdential data in order to publicly release
it, without revealing conﬁdential information that could be linked to an speciﬁc
individual or entity. Good surveys about protection methods can be found in
the literature [1,3].
Recently, microaggregation has emerged as one of the most promising data
protection methods. For example, the work in [7] shows that microaggregation
is used by many oﬃcial statistics institutes for data anonymization. The basic
implementation of microaggregation [3,4,16] works as follows: given a data set
with A attributes, small clusters of at least k elements (records) are built and
each original record is replaced with the centroid of the cluster to which the
record belongs. A certain level of privacy is ensured because k records have an
identical protected value (k-anonymity [15,17,18]).
However, when the complexity of the records in the data set is large and, thus,
the number of attributes A is large, microaggregation techniques suﬀer from a
low statistical utility. This is so because the larger the number of attributes,
the larger the distance between the original records in the data set and their
corresponding centroids. Therefore, a lot of information of the original data is
lost when the protected data set is released.
1 To solve this drawback, the following natural strategy is usually used:
the data set is split into smaller blocks of attributes and microaggregation
is independently applied to each block. In this way, the information loss is
lower, at the cost of an increase of the disclosure risk. In other words, the
property of k-anonymity is not ensured anymore, as we explain later in this
paper.
In this work, we propose to combine a set of preprocessing steps along with
the microaggregation in order to minimize the disclosure risk without losing
information. We test this new method using real data sets showing that Mic1D−
κ is able to outperform previous microaggregation methods diminishing the risk
of disclosure without increasing the information loss. Speciﬁcally, we compare
our new method with one of the most commonly used microaggregationmethods,
the MDAV (Maximum Distance to Average Vector) algorithm [4], showing that
Mic1D − κ achieves lower disclosure risk than MDAV when diﬀerent groups of
attributes are known by an intruder.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic concepts
related to protection methods in general (and microaggregation in particular).
In Section 3, we present our new microaggregation method called One dimension
microaggregation. Section 4 is devoted to compare traditional MDAV microag-
gregation with our new microaggregation method with real data sets; we explain
the ingredients of our experiments and the obtained results. Finally, Section 5
draws some conclusions and presents some future work.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we explain some basic concepts that will be useful for the rest of
the paper. Namely, we ﬁrst describe the scenario where a microdata protection
method is applied to preserve the privacy of the owners of some statistical data.
Then, we recall one of the most used protection methods, microaggregation, and
one of its heuristic variants: MDAV. Finally, we describe a way to measure the
quality of a given microaggregation method, according to the levels of privacy
and statistical utility that it provides.
2.1 Statistical Data Protection
A data set X can be seen as a matrix with n rows (records) and A columns (at-
tributes), where each row contains A attributes of an individual. The attributes
in a data set can be classiﬁed according to two diﬀerent categories, identiﬁers
or quasi-identiﬁers, depending on their capability to identify unique individu-
als. Among the quasi-identiﬁer attributes, we distinguish between conﬁdential
and non-conﬁdential ones, depending on the kind of information they contain.
Because of this, we write X = Xid||Xnc||Xc.
In this paper, we consider the following scenario for statistical disclosure con-
trol, which was deﬁned in [3] to compare several protection methods.
(i) Identiﬁer attributes in X are either removed or encrypted. Therefore reduce
X to X = Xnc||Xc.
(ii) Conﬁdential quasi-identiﬁer attributes Xc are not modiﬁed, and so we have
X ′c = Xc; in this way, the statistical utility of the conﬁdential attributes is
completely preserved.
(iii) A microdata protection method ρ is applied to non-conﬁdential quasi-
identiﬁer attributes, in order to preserve the privacy of the individuals
whose conﬁdential data is being released. This leads to a protected data
set X ′nc = ρ(Xnc).
(iv) The released data set is X ′ = X ′nc||X ′c = ρ(Xnc)||Xc.
After applying this protection procedure, the disclosure risk caused by an in-
truder that, ﬁrst, obtains non-conﬁdential attributes from other sources and,
then, tries to re-identify entities by using record linkage methods between these
external information and Xnc is reduced, since Xnc has been obfuscated by using
X ′nc instead.
2.2 Microaggregation
As we explained before, microaggregation builds small clusters of at least k
elements of A attributes and replaces the original records by the centroid of the
cluster to which the records belong.
The goal of a microaggregation method is to minimize the total Sum of the
Square Error
SSE =
c∑
i=1
∑
xij∈Ci
(xij − x¯i)T (xij − x¯i),
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where c is the total number of clusters, Ci is the i-th cluster and x¯i is the centroid
of Ci. The restriction is |Ci| ≥ k, for all i = 1, . . . , c.
If a microaggregation method is applied to all the A attributes of the original
data set X at the same time; then, the resulting protected data set X ′ satisﬁes
the property of k-anonymity [18]: each protected record can correspond to at
least k original records. However, in order to increase the statistical utility of
the released (protected) information, statistical agencies usually split the whole
data set X into blocks of a few attributes ai (
∑C
i=1 ai = A where C is the total
number of blocks), and then apply a microaggregation method to each block,
independently. In this way, k-anonymity is not preserved anymore.
In the case of univariate microaggregation (ai = 1), there exist polynomial
time algorithms to obtain the optimal microaggregation [8]. The main drawback
of univariate microaggregation is that it provides a bad level of privacy, due
to its high disclosure risk [13]. However, for the multivariate case (ai > 1), the
problem of ﬁnding the optimal microaggregation is NP-hard [14]. For this reason,
multivariate microaggregation methods are heuristic. In this paper, we recall one
of the most commonly used multivariate techniques: MDAV microaggregation.
2.3 MDAV Microagregation
The MDAV (Maximum Distance to Average Vector) algorithm [4] is a heuristic
algorithm for clustering records in a data set X so that each cluster is constrained
to have at least k records.
MDAV works as follows. First, MDAV computes the average record x¯ of all
records in X , then, MDAV builds two clusters. In order to build them, MDAV
considers the most distant record xr to the average record x¯ and forms a cluster
around xr (this cluster contains xr together with the k−1 closest records to xr).
When the cluster is done, all the records belonging to this cluster are removed
from X . Following, the most distant record xs from record xr is taken and a
new cluster is done around xs, again, all the records belonging to this cluster
are removed. This process is repeated until all the records are assigned to one
cluster. Finally, the protected data set X ′ is built replacing the original records
in X by the centroid of the cluster to which the record belongs.
Note that this process can be done considering all the attributes in the data
set at the same time, or the data set can be split into smaller blocks of attributes
and MDAV is independently applied to each block. The former option ensures
the k-anonymity property with a large information loss, and the second one
ensures a small information loss, but k-anonymity property is not preserved any
more.
2.4 Performance Measure for Microaggregation
A microdata protection method must guarantee a certain level of privacy (low
disclosure risk). At the same time, since the goal is to allow third parties to
perform reliable statistical computations over the released (protected) data, the
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protection method must ensure somehow that the protected data is statistically
close to the original one.
Therefore, we have two inversely related aspects to measure, for eachmicrodata
protection method: the disclosure risk (DR), which is the risk that an intruder
obtains correct links between the protected and the original data; and the infor-
mation loss (IL) caused by the protection method. When one of them increases,
the other one decreases. The two extreme cases are the following ones: (i) if the
original microdata is released, then information loss is zero, but the disclosure risk
is maximum; (ii) if the original microdata is encrypted and then released, the dis-
closure risk is (almost) zero, but the information loss is maximum.
There are diﬀerent measures proposed in the literature to evaluate the quality
of a data protection method. Such measures can be general (for all protection
methods) or speciﬁc for a given data protection method. For instance, the goal of
microaggregation is to minimize the total Sum of the Square Error SSE. Since
there are no optimal solutions in polynomial time to multivariate microaggrega-
tion, and the methods used are heuristic, the actual value of SSE for a given
method is a measure of its quality with regards to information loss.
Regarding privacy, microaggregation provides, by deﬁnition, some level of
anonymity. If the method is applied to all the attributes (a single block), then
the initial parameter k indicates the achieved anonymity: for each protected
record, there are at least k possible original records which can correspond to it.
However, if the original data set is split into r blocks and the microaggregation
method is applied to each block independently, then the ﬁnal level of anonymity
obviously decreases: two records which are in the same cluster for one block
of attributes may be in diﬀerent clusters for other blocks, which results in two
diﬀerent protected records.
A possible way of computing the real level of anonymity achieved by a mi-
croaggregation method is to consider the ratio between the total number n of
records and the number of protected records which are diﬀerent. This gives the
average size of each “global cluster” in the protected data set. We denote as k′
this real anonymity measure:
k′ =
n
|{x′|x′ ∈ X ′}|
It was introduced in [11] and used in other papers like [12].
3 One Dimension Microaggregation
One dimension microaggregation (Mic1D-κ) uses the same vision of data handling
based on the vectorization, sorting and partitioning of all the values in the data
set presented in [9]. There are several aspects that motivate these three steps:
Vectorization. The ﬁrst step is vectorization. The basic idea is to gather all the
values in the data set in a single vector, independently of the attribute they
belong to. This way, we are ignoring the attribute semantics and, therefore,
the possible correlation between two diﬀerent attributes in the data set.
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Sorting. Once all the values are inserted in the unique vector, it is necessary to
sort them in order to minimize the SSE value when the clusters (partitions)
are done. Note that sorting the values is a way of adding noise.
Partitioning. In order to ensure a certain level of privacy (k-anonymity), we
propose to split the data set in several κ-partitions and to calculate the
average value for each partition. Modifying the value of κ, Mic1D-κ allow us
to adjust the trade-oﬀ between information loss (SSE) and disclosure risk.
Note that if the data set was not sorted, κ would not have this property.
Since the ranges of values of two diﬀerent attributes could diﬀer signiﬁcantly, the
sorting step may not merge all the values coming from diﬀerent attributes appro-
priately. For this reason, after the partitioning is complete, data is normalized
in each partition and it is sorted and re-partitioned again. Data normalization
improves the attribute merging and therefore, it is more diﬃcult for an intruder
to re-identify an individual. Finally, data in each partition is substituted by their
centroid. All the steps of Mic1D-κ are represented in Figure 1.
Mean value
computation
De-
normalization
{pm,n} {pm,n}
Vectorization Partitioning NormalizationSorting
D
V VS {Pm} {Pm}
Data 
Pre-processing
Data Set 
Protection
N = R · a
R
a
P
k
r
Fig. 1. Mic1D-κ schema
Formally speaking, let D be the original data set to be protected. We denote
by R the number of records in D. Each record consists of a numerical attributes
or ﬁelds. We assume that none of the registers contain blanks. We denote by N
the total number of values in D. As a consequence, N = R · a.
Let V be a vector of size N . Mic1D-κ treats values in the data set indepen-
dently of the attribute they belong to. In other words, the concepts of record
and ﬁeld is ignored and the N values in the data set are placed in V . We call
this process desemantization.
First, V is sorted increasingly. Let us denote by Vs the ordered vector of size N
containing the sorted data and vi the ith element of vector Vs, where 0 ≤ i < N .
Next, Vs is divided into smaller sub-vectors or partitions. Each sub-vector is
normalized into the [0, 1] interval and they are all sorted and partitioned again.
We deﬁne κ, where 1 < κ ≤ N , as the number of values per partition. Note
that if κ is not a divisor of N the last partition will contain a smaller number
of values. Let P be the number of κ-partitions. We call r the number of values
in the last partition where 0 ≤ r < κ. Therefore, N = κP + r. If r > 0 the we
have P + 1 partitions. We denote by Pm the mth partition.
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Let vm,n be deﬁned as the nth element of Pm:
{
vm,n := vmκ+n n = 0 . . . κ − 1 m = 0 . . . P − 1
vP,n := vPκ+n n = 0 . . . r − 1
For each partition Pm, the mean value of its components is computed:
μm =
κ−1∑
n=0
vm,n
κ
m = 0 . . . P − 1 μP =
r−1∑
n=0
vP,n
r
where the latter expression is applied to the last partition if r > 0, i.e., if κ does
not divide the total number of values in the data set.
The protected value pm,n for vm,n is then:
{
pm,n = μm n = 0 . . . κ − 1 m = 0 . . . P − 1
pP,n = μP n = 0 . . . r − 1
Finally, Mic1D-κ de-normalizes the data into the original range. The protected
values are placed in the protected data set in the same place occupied by the
corresponding vm,n in the original data set. This way, we are undoing the sorting
and vectorization steps.
4 Experimental Results
We have tested Mic1D-κ and compared our results with those obtained by the
MDAV algorithm, using the Census [19] and Water-treatment [10] data sets.
The former was extracted using the Data Extraction System of the U.S. Census
Bureau and contains 1080 records consisting of 13 numerical attributes. The
latter was extracted from the UCI repository and contains 35 attributes and
380 entries. These data sets have been used in previous works [3,11] to compare
diﬀerent microaggregation techniques.
As shown in [12], when protecting a data set using multivariate microaggre-
gation, the way in which the data is split to form blocks is highly relevant with
regard to the degree of privacy achieved (k′ value). Similarly, we have reduced
both data sets to have 9 attributes, which we detail in Tables 1 and 2.
In both data sets, attributes a1, a2 and a3 are highly correlated, as well as
attributes a4, a5 and a6 and attributes a7, a8 and a9. On the contrary, attributes
of diﬀerent blocks are non-correlated. For our experiments, when protecting data
using MDAV microaggregation, we assume attributes to be split in three blocks
of three attributes each. Also, we consider two situations when protecting the
data sets using MDAV microaggregation: blocking correlated attributes and thus
non-correlated blocks, i.e., (a1, a2, a3), (a4, a5, a6) and (a7, a8, a9); or blocking
non-correlated attributes but correlated blocks, i.e., (a1, a4, a7), (a2, a5, a8) and
(a3, a6, a9). Testing these two cases will let us study the impact of the choice of
the attributes for the microaggregation groups, based on their correlations.
For each data set and attribute selection method, we apply MDAV microag-
gregation using the same parameterizations as those in previous works [11,12].
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Table 1. Attribute description of the Census data set
id Name Description
a1 AGI Adjusted gross income
a2 FICA Social security retirement payroll deduction
a3 INTVAL Amount of interest income
a4 EMCONTRB Employer contribution for health insurance
a5 TAXINC Taxable income amount
a6 WSALVAL Amount: Total wage and salary
a7 ERNVAL Business or farm net earnings in 19
a8 PEARNVAL Total person earnings
a9 POTHVAL Total other persons income
Table 2. Attribute description of the Water data set
id Name Description
a1 PH-E Input pH to plant
a2 PH-P Input pH to primary settler
a3 PH-D Input pH to secondary settler
a4 DQO-E Input chemical demand of oxygen to plant
a5 COND-P Input conductivity to primary settler
a6 COND-D Input conductivity to secondary settler
a7 DBO-S Output biological demand of oxygen
a8 SS-S Output suspended solids
a9 SED-S Output sediments
Namely, we protect the data sets using MDAV with parameter k = 5, 25, 50, 75,
100 for the Census data set, and k = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 for the Water-treatment
data set. The selection of these values aims at covering a wide range of SSE
values and, thus, studying scenarios with diﬀerent information loss values.
For Mic1D-κ, we use κ = 3000, 3200, 4000, 4400, 5000 for the Census data
set and κ = 300, 500, 800, 850, 900 for the Water-treatment data set. Note
that, since Mic1D-κ desemantizes the data set, there is no point in considering
diﬀerent situations related to the correlation of the attributes and, therefore, we
protect the data set just once for each parametrization. In order to make the
comparison fair, we have chosen the values of κ in Mic1D-κ to obtain similar
SSE values to those obtained by MDAV after protecting the data sets.
We consider that a possible intruder knows the value of three random at-
tributes of the original data set. Diﬀerent tests are performed assuming that the
intruder knows diﬀerent sets of three attributes. Depending on these attributes
the intruder will have information coming from one or more groups. Table 3
shows all the considered possibilities.
First, we suppose that the three known attributes belong to the same MDAV
microaggregated block (e.g. (a1, a2, a3) in the correlated scenario or (a1, a4, a7)
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Table 3. Diﬀerent groups of variables known by the intruder
1G (a1, a2, a3), (a4, a5, a6), (a7, a8, a9)
C
or
re
la
te
d
2G (a1, a2, a5), (a1, a3, a7), (a2, a3, a6), (a1, a4, a5), (a2, a4, a6)
(a5, a6, a9), (a6, a7, a8), (a1, a8, a9), (a2, a7, a9)
3G (a1, a4, a7), (a1, a5, a8), (a1, a6, a9), (a2, a4, a7), (a2, a5, a8)
(a2, a6, a9), (a3, a4, a7), (a3, a5, a8), (a3, a6, a9)
1G (a1, a4, a7), (a2, a5, a8), (a3, a6, a9)
N
on
-c
or
re
la
te
d
2G (a1, a4, a5), (a1, a3, a7), (a4, a7, a8), (a1, a2, a5), (a2, a4, a8)
(a5, a8, a9), (a3, a6, a8), (a1, a6, a9), (a3, a4, a9)
3G (a1, a2, a3), (a1, a5, a6), (a1, a8, a9), (a2, a3, a4), (a4, a5, a6)
(a4, a8, a9), (a2, a3, a7), (a5, a6, a7), (a7, a8, a9)
Table 4. SSE and real k′ values using MDAV-k and Mic1D-κ methods assuming that
diﬀerent groups of variables are known by the intruder using the Census data set
SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k
5 64.99 5.00 1.92 1.00
25 223.73 25.12 7.00 1.09
50 328.31 51.43 14.66 1.41
75 382.34 77.14 23.18 1.96
100 428.68 108.00 35.00 3.33
M
ic
1D
-κ
3000 32.27 8.37 9.87 5.77
3200 89.18 11.97 13.76 8.26
4000 129.06 20.10 22.09 13.89
4400 310.63 23.15 26.94 17.01
5000 738.12 72.83 76.08 55.02
Correlated attributes
SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k
5 58.49 5.00 1.96 1.02
25 260.13 25.12 7.35 1.24
50 356.47 51.43 15.86 2.05
75 563.79 77.14 24.38 2.83
100 721.91 108.00 36.14 4.62
M
ic
1D
-κ
3000 32.27 5.63 8.51 8.04
3200 89.18 8.01 11.95 11.83
4000 129.06 13.53 19.45 19.19
4400 310.63 16.62 23.64 22.45
5000 738.12 59.77 67.72 67.25
Non-correlated attributes
in the non-correlated). Since the size of the three microagreggation blocks is
3, there are only three options to consider. We denote this case by 1G. Since
the intruder only has access to data from one group, MDAV ensures the k-
anonymity property (this is the best possible scenario for MDAV). However, note
that, usually, the intruder cannot choose the attributes obtained from external
sources and it might be diﬃcult to obtain all the attributes in the same group.
Second, we assume that the known attributes belong to two diﬀerent MDAV
microaggregated groups. There are many possible combinations of three
attributes under this assumption, so nine of them were chosen randomly. We
refer to this case as 2G. Finally, case 3G is deﬁned analogously to 2G, and also
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Table 5. SSE and real k′ values using MDAV-k and Mic1D-κ methods assuming that
diﬀerent groups of variables are known by the intruder using the Water data set
SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k
5 28.18 5.09 1.94 1.00
10 46.14 10.00 3.14 1.01
15 72.03 15.20 4.42 1.01
20 94.24 20.00 5.75 1.04
25 114.56 25.33 7.28 1.10
M
ic
1D
-κ
300 32.67 1.62 1.51 1.10
500 65.89 3.25 3.39 1.76
800 80.95 7.87 7.55 4.67
850 132.13 9.65 10.03 6.65
900 255.64 12.95 13.61 9.14
Correlated attributes
SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k
5 69.51 5.00 2.03 1.03
10 126.21 10.00 3.55 1.16
15 173.96 15.20 5.28 1.39
20 259.07 20.00 7.00 1.53
25 247.58 25.33 9.22 1.91
M
ic
1D
-κ
300 32.67 1.11 1.35 1.35
500 65.89 1.78 2.58 2.63
800 80.95 4.74 7.17 6.88
850 132.13 6.54 9.77 8.67
900 255.64 9.07 14.52 11.71
Non-correlated attributes
nine possibilities of known attributes are considered. Note that, in both scenar-
ios 2G and 3G, k-anonymity is not ensured by MDAV. Note also that, if the
intruder had more than three attributes, it would not be possible to consider
1G. We are considering the case were the intruder only has three attributes to
study a scenario were MDAV can still preserve k-anonymity.
The ﬁrst column of Tables 4 and 5 presents the SSE values for all the parame-
terizations and situations described before. Note that the range of SSE covered
by the two methods is similar, so this allows us to compare the disclosure risk
of both methods fairly. For all these scenarios, we compute k′ and the mean of
all the k′ values in each situation is presented in the second, third and fourth
columns. Note that, whereas MDAV is aﬀected by the fact that the chosen at-
tributes are correlated or not, this eﬀect is not noticeable using Mic1D − κ.
Speciﬁcally, when the attributes in a group are not correlated, the information
loss (SSE) using MDAV tends to be increased since we are trying to collapse
the records in a single value, using three independent attributes or dimensions.
Nevertheless, this eﬀect can be neglected with our technique since, thanks to
the data preprocessing, the whole microaggregation process is performed on a
single dimension (vector of values), the semantics of attributes are ignored and
the eﬀect caused by attribute correlations is avoided.
Results show that, in general, Mic1D − κ achieves lower disclosure risk lev-
els (larger values of k′) than those achieved by MDAV for similar information loss
(SSE), especiallywhen the attributes chosen come fromdiﬀerentmicroaggregated
groups (2G and 3G), which is the most common case. When the intruder has ac-
cess to the three attributes coming from a single microaggregated group, MDAV
presents k′ values which are similar or, in some cases, even larger than those ob-
tained by Mic1D − κ (comparing cases with similar SSE). This is normal since
MDAVpreserves the k-anonymity in this case. However, in the remaining scenarios
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(2G and 3G), that representmost of the cases,Mic1D−κ achieves larger k′ values
than those obtained by MDAV when similar SSE values are compared.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a new type of microaggregation called One Di-
mension microaggregation. This microaggregation method signiﬁcantly diminish
the problem of attribute selection in multivariate microaggregation achieving
in general a higher level of privacy than that obtained by MDAV, one of the
most well-known microaggregation methods. This is specially true as, from the
attributes known by the intruder, the number of these coming from diﬀerent
microaggregation groups of MDAV increases.
As future work, we plan to further study One Dimension microaggregation
using other information loss and disclosure risk measures. We also plan to develop
and implement a method for vector partitioning which considers the SSE value
when the partitions are done so that we can reduce the SSE value of our method
and, therefore, the information loss.
All in all, in this paper we show that microaggregation can be a very useful
method for the anonymization of complex records containing a large number of
attributes, when it is combined with the data preprocessing proposed in our work.
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